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Abstract –We study the effects of introducing information inefficiency in a model for a random
linear economy with a representative consumer. This is done by considering statistical, instead
of classical, economic general equilibria. Employing two different approaches we show that inef-
ficiency increases the consumption set of a consumer but decreases her expected utility. In this
scenario economic activity grows while welfare shrinks, what is contrary to the behavior obtained
by considering a rational consumer.
Introduction. – Standard microeconomic theory
states that an agent faced with a choice of goods or ser-
vices to purchase will maximize an expected utility func-
tion given her constraints [1]. It also predicts an equilib-
rium state resulting from these agents simultanously and
independently trying to optimize their own choices.
Over the last decade these assumptions have been under
intense scrutiny [2, 3]. Among other factors, the 2007-
2008 mortgage crisis, for which the predictions made by
mainstream theories were ineffective in preventing, and
the growing empirical body of evidence being gathered in
the field of Behavioral Economics have shown that perfect
rationality may be a very poor proxy for the observed
behavior of economic agents.
In fact, it has been shown that modelling agents to have
zero intelligence also produces realistic results [4,5] due to
general statistical properties that may emerge in inter-
acting systems. As argued by the authors in [5], treat-
ing economic agents as having full rationality and perfect
knowledge is clearly a significant assumption, so why not
model the other end of the spectrum? It has been shown
in [6] that, for an economy in which trades occur in a
random fashion, the equilibrium wealth distribution is a
Gibbs distribution. This is very close to empirical obser-
vations for several countries, at least in the bulk of the
distribution. By adding a rate of return on capital, power
law distributions are obtained [7], what is again consistent
with empirical data for top earners.
Statistical mechanics provides a robust framework,
based on maximum entropy principles, for identifying and
calculating macroscopic quantities relevant for the descrip-
tion of interacting systems. Within this framework, the
temperature of a system represents how large observed
deviations from the ground state are likely to be. Clearly,
a zero temperature system is always at the configuration
which minimizes its energy function, while a system at in-
finite temperature will be at any configuration allowed by
its constraints with equal probability.
These considerations suggest a way to model consumers
that may turn to be more realistic: the degree of rational-
ity may be represented as a parameter within a statistical
mechanics model with energy given by the negative utility.
A similar approach has already appeared in the contexts
of game theory [8, 9] and general equilibrium [10,11].
Although deviations from maximum utility are here
named, in accordance with economics literature, “subopti-
mal” or “inefficient”, it is common knowledge in statistical
inference that a “softmax” decision rule can actually be
beneficial if the agent has incomplete knowledge about the
universe of available options.
In this paper we discuss two approaches for considering
consumer irrationality and show that they qualitatively
lead to the same behavior for important macroeconomic
quantities.
The Random Linear Economy Model. – In a ran-
dom linear economy [12] there are M goods, N technolo-
gies and a single representative consumer. Let n = N/M
represent the multiplicity of technologies per good.
A consumer is endowed by an initial bundle of goods
x0 = (x
1
0, . . . , x
M
0 ). We will be interested in an ensemble
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of economies with a given technology multiplicity. We
suppose an endowment xµ0 ≥ 0 is drawn independently
from an exponential distribution. Consumer preferences
are ordered according to a separable utility function
U(x) =
M∑
µ=1
u(xµ).
The consumer optimizes its utility subject to a budget
constraint x · p ≤ x0 · p, where p represents a vector of
prices.
In a closed economy, markets clear at equilibrium so
that firms inputs have to come from consumer’s initial
endowment. The N dimensional production scale vector
s satisfies
x = x0 +
N∑
i=1
siξi. (1)
Every firm in the market is equipped with a random
technology ξi = (ξ
1
i , . . . , ξ
µ
i ), where ξ
µ
i < 0 represents an
input and ξµi > 0 represents an output. Thus, a firm
represents a transformation in the space of goods given
by the M dimensional vector siξi. The firm has to de-
cide at what scale si it will operate its technology so that
profits sipi · ξi are maximized. We consider normally dis-
tributed elements ξµi with variance 1/M constrained by∑M
µ=1 ξ
µ
i = −. For  > 0 every technology is inefficient
and it is impossible to couple two or more of them in order
to produce an infinite amount of a good.
The market clearing condition implies that the utili-
ties and profits can be maximized simultaneously. Opti-
mal consumer bundle x∗ = arg maxx U(x) and production
scales s∗i = arg maxsi sipi · ξi are attained when prices are
set to satisfy the first order condition for the consumer
utility maximization problem pµ =
∂U
∂xµ
. At the equilib-
rium, firms production and the market prices can be set
to satisfy consumer’s desired demand, and no actor in the
market has an incentive to deviate from this state.
Market clearing, however, carries a strong restriction. If
we multiply both sides of the equation (1) by p, we get
p · (x− x0) =
∑
i
sip · ξi. (2)
The budget condition implies a non-positive left side, while
the right hand side of this equation is necessarily non-
negative, as the scale of production can be made si = 0
to avoid losses. The equation is, therefore, only satisfied
when agents spend their budget to the limit, to say, when
p · x = p · x0, and when firm profits vanish, p · ξi = 0, or
firms leave the market, and si = 0.
Equation (2) also implies that not more than M dif-
ferent technologies can be simultaneously active at equi-
librium. This can be seen by observing that, for n > 1,
p · ξi = 0 represents an overdetermined linear system with
N equations and M variables.
This model has some very interesting properties which
are described at length in [12] and more recently explored
in [13]. In particular, given an ensemble of economies,
we can calculate the probability distributions of x and s
(and therefore of p) and find that all macroscopic quanti-
ties derived from these two quantities depend on the tech-
nology multiplicity per good n = N/M . When n < 2,
the market is competitive and the fraction of active firms
φ =
∑
i I(si > 0)/N is around φ = 0.5. As each firm has
on average half the goods as inputs and half as outputs,
when n < 2, the number of technologies is not sufficient to
produce every combination of M goods demanded. The
space of goods is not spanned by the technologies avail-
able.
When n > 2, however, there are so many technologies
to choose from that it is possible to find M linear indepen-
dent firms that span the whole space of goods. The market
thus becomes monopolistic and φ vanishes asymptotically
with n as the maximum number of active technologies is
M .
In Economics the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a
measure of the total market value of final goods produced
in a given period. In the random linear economy model,
the consequence of the market clearing condition (2) is
that no net market value is created by the transforma-
tion process. An alternative measure of economic activity
within the model is provided by
Y =
∑M
µ=1 |xµ − xµ0 |pµ
2
∑M
µ=0 pµ
. (3)
In [12] it is shown that in the competitive regime n < 2,
a new technology has a positive effect on economic ac-
tivity Y , while in the monopolistic regime n > 2, new
technologies have negligible impact on the economic ac-
tivity. Our goals in this paper is revisiting this result in a
setting where the representative consumer is an inefficient
optimizer.
In what follows we do that in two different ways. In the
first approach we employ a maximum entropy argument
for replacing the idea that the consumer is a hyperrational
maximizer. In the second approach we suppose that the
consumer actually optimizes a noisy version of her utility.
The Irrational Consumer. – We now turn to the
problem of treating the consumer as an agent that makes
suboptimal choices with as little extra assumptions for her
behavior as possible.
An answer for this type of question is provided by sta-
tistical mechanics in the form of the following inference
problem: find the probability distribution for x that has
maximum entropy given the constraints that P (x) is a
probability distribution and the average utility U¯ is ob-
served [15]. Using the simplifying notation that
∫
dx =∫∞
0
· · · ∫∞
0
∏
µ dxµ, we want to find the function P (x) that
maximizes the functional
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S[P (x)] =−
∫ ∞
0
dxP (x) logP (x)− α
(∫
dxP (x)− 1
)
+ β
(∫
dxU(x)P (x)− U¯
)
, (4)
where α and β are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints.
The well known solution for this entropy maximization
problem is the Gibbs distribution:
P (x) =
1
Z(β)
eβU(x), (5)
where Z =
∫∞
0
dxeβU(x) is the normalization term and
β is a free parameter that controls how much we allow
for deviations from the maximum. It is clear that in the
limit β → ∞ the distribution collapses to a Dirac delta
in its maximum and the inference reduces to the classi-
cal consumer problem. We, however, have found in β a
way to introduce deviations from the maximum. Addi-
tionally, the maximum entropy argument assures we are
not introducing unjustified assumptions about consumer’s
behavior.
Because market clearing still holds, we can plug equa-
tion (1) directly into the Gibbs distribution. The proba-
bility of the consumer choosing a bundle x becomes the
probability of firms setting a production vector s, given
by:
P (s|ξ, x0) = 1
Z
eβU(x0+
∑
i siξi) (6)
Although this distribution is intractable, except for
β →∞, we still can find the expected values of macroeco-
nomic variables for a random linear economy by Metropo-
lis sampling averaged over the disorder (ξ, x0). We proceed
by first finding the average fraction of active firms 〈φ〉ξ,x0
at the equilibrium as a function of β. The results are
shown in Figure 1. We see that the inefficiency parameter
β has a strong influence on the “two regimes” observed
in the efficient case, which is shown by making β > 105.
For lower values, the monopolistic regime vanishes, and
after a certain point the fraction of active firms actually
increases with n.
More interesting, however, are the behavior of other
macroeconomic variables of the model. By definition, a
rational consumer increases her utility as n increases. If
the supply of trades is expanded by the introduction of
new firms operating in a market, the agent can always
choose to keep her current exchange or replace it for a
better one.
However, when agents are irrational that is not not al-
ways the case. In this case we can compute numerically
the average utility per good 〈u〉 for the consumer as a
function of n:
〈u〉 = 1
M
〈U〉ξ,x0 =
1
M
∫
dx
∫
dξdx0U(x)
1
Z
eβU(x). (7)
Fig. 1: Fraction of active firms φ as a function of the tech-
nological multiplicity n, for different values of β. In these
simulations  = 0.05 and M = 64 averaged over 400 runs.
As expected, β → ∞ implies φ → 0.5 for n << 2. Above
the dashed line no global prices capable of supporting eco-
nomic activity can be defined.
As can be seen in Figure 2, for large β, 〈u〉 is an increas-
ing function of n, as expected. However, when inefficiency
is increased, the average utility of the consumer becomes a
decreasing function. This result corroborates a number of
empirical observations in Behavioral Economics claiming
that consuming options can turn to be excessive [16, 17]:
as the number of options available to a consumer without
perfect knowledge and full rationality increases the prob-
ability of choice mistakes also increases.
As a proxy for economic activity, we also calculate the
absolute amount of goods traded, that is given by
Λ =
1
M
M∑
µ=1
|xµ − xµ0 | (8)
We observe in the simulations depicted in the lower
panel of Figure 2 that the economic activity always in-
creases as a function of the technological density n, but the
rate of increase in Λ also increases with the inefficiency, as
opposed to the utility. This is our main observation: irra-
tional choices enhance the amount of goods traded while
worsening the quality of what is acquired, decreasing con-
sumer’s utility.
A difficulty with our analysis still remains: whereas orig-
inally the prices were uniquely defined by the first order
condition of the consumer’s optimization problem, in this
new framework there is no such restraint. Given a proba-
bility distribution P (x|ξ, x0), it is an ill-posed problem to
define the price vector from it. In fact, any price vector p
satisfying
p · ξi = 0, for all i if si > 0 (9)
would be an equally good choice.
Since we have Na equations of this type, one for each
active firm, and M unknown variables pµ, the above equa-
p-3
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Fig. 2: Top. Average utility of the consumer as a function
of n, for different values of β. Bottom. Average economic
activity for the economy as a function of n.
tions have no solution for Na > M , provided that ξi are
linearly independent.
In terms of φ, this means that for φ > 1/n there is
no global price vector p that supports economic activ-
ity. The curve φ = 1/n is plotted (dashed line) in Figure
1. The model only stays, for all n, in the region where
global prices are possible when very close to rationality (β
large). When there is a level of inefficiency, there is always
a threshold n, above which no global prices can exist.
This does not mean that no market transactions will
take place, instead it means that in this approach prices
must be defined for each of the N suppliers.
Noisy Utility. – As an alternative along the lines of
[14], we can modify the classical setup so that the equilib-
rium is still reached from a maximization problem solved
by the consumer. We suppose now that the representative
consumer thinks she is rationally optimizing an utility U .
However, she is actually optimizing another utility UT , a
noisy version of U .
Call UT the “true” utility function and write it as
UT (x) = U(x) + h · x, (10)
where h is a M dimensional vector with all entries sampled
independently from an exponential distribution with scale
λ. This extra term represents a part of the utility unknown
by the consumer herself. We point out that the true utility
function UT is still a concave function and therefore the
equilibrium is still unique and well behaved.
It can be shown [14] that the resulting probability dis-
tribution for x, when the consumer is maximizing the
utility distribution UT (x), is the Gibbs distribution for
U(x). This allows us to reformulate the problem in terms
of a consumer that does not choose the “optimal” utility,
keeping a well defined price vector which results from the
usual first order conditions. For example, for the utility
U(x) =
∑
µ log(xµ) the price of a good would be given by
pµ = ∂µUt(x) =
1
xµ
+ hµ.
The results for the fraction of active firms φ are now the
same of the rational agent case and we still have a com-
petitive regime for n < 2 and a monopolistic regime for
n > 2. However, the behavior of the macroeconomic quan-
tities reproduces that of the inefficient consumer. Figure
3 depicts solutions of the maximization process of UT for
various values of the scale λ for the exponential distribu-
tion of hµ.
As in the previous case, above a threshold λ, the ob-
served utility decreases with n, while the GDP increases.
In this approach we had to introduce additional assump-
tions about consumer’s utility. As it was noticed by the
authors of [14], the Gibbs distribution for the observed
depends on very general conditions for the unknown part,
therefore, the results we have obtained are supposed to be
robust to different choices in the perturbed utility.
Conclusion. – We have shown that the introduction
of irrationality in the behavior a representative consumer
implies in macroeconomic behavior very distinct of what
is the derived from classical rationality axioms.
Provided the coupling between demand and supply im-
posed by a market clearing scenario, as inefficiency is in-
troduced to the consumer behavior, the supply side is ex-
posed to less selection and the consumer is flooded by an
overabundance of low utility goods. What corroborates
results from Behavioral Economics [16,17].
With less selection the supply side produces more and
GDP grows. Thus a larger number of consumption options
may result in poorer choices while increasing economic
activity.
Our conclusion may be intriguing: for a whole coun-
try’s economy it is seems desirable that its consumers are
less rational agents as less efficiency in choice leads to en-
hanced GDP and tax revenues. If we thinks of country
development as an evolutionary process, there would be
incentives for less rational consumers, penalizing the lower
economic activity of more a efficient demand side. Addi-
tionally, if the average utility can be considered a proxy
p-4
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Fig. 3: Top. Average observed utility of the consumer
as a function of n in the unoberserved utility framework,
for different values of β. Bottom. Average GDP for the
economy as a function of n.
for individual fitness, then a more rational consumer would
thrive in a country with low choice efficiency, suggesting
that an interesting competition process may take place.
This is certainly too deep a conclusion to be arrived
from just this simple model. However, the results may be
robust for other equilibrium scenarios, and we hope this
paper sets the stage for future research on the topic.
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